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PAY-TO-STAY IN CALIFORNIA JAILS AND THE 
VALUE OF SYSTEMIC SELF-EMBARASSMENT 
Robert Weisberg* † 
Introduction 
The website of the Santa Ana, California-version of Pay-to-Stay uses 
hotelier-type verbiage in describing features of its alternative jail program. It 
tells us that the jail “is pleased to host a full range of alternatives to tradi-
tional incarceration”; it reassures prospective “clients” seeking flexible 
work/jail schedules (“Work on Saturday or Sunday? No problem, your 
weekend days are our weekend days.”); it guarantees “24-hour on-site medi-
cal staff”; it accommodates inmates near and far (“We have helped clients 
with sentences from other counties as well as other states.”); and it generally 
brags that the jail “is the most modern and comfortable facility in the re-
gion,” where, à la Cheers, “Each of our clients has a name . . . .”  
Surely this manifestation of pay-to-stay is embarrassing. But, as so hon-
estly represented, pay-to-stay could prove salutary for the criminal justice 
system if recognized as part of our somewhat ritualized cycle of construc-
tive self-embarrassment over the role of wealth in criminal justice. More 
specifically, pay-to-stay could become one of those occasional eruptions of 
transparency about the forms of currency exchanged in the market for pun-
ishment.  
I. The Market for Punishment 
Let me explore one slightly off-kilter example to highlight the mercan-
tile nature of criminal justice. In the briefly notorious case of United States 
v. Singleton (1998), a Tenth Circuit panel threatened to undo the universal
practice of prosecutors offering leniency to defendants in exchange for tes-
timony against other defendants. With bold literalness, the panel declared 
that, in making a fairly standard deal with an informant, the prosecutor had 
violated a portion of the federal bribery and gratuities statute. Under this 
law, “whoever” gives “anything of value” for testimony has committed a 
felony. (Indeed, having gone this far, the court could have even upped the 
ante to a still more serious felony by accusing the prosecutor of accepting a 
bribe from the putative witness.)  
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The eruption in Singleton was quickly snuffed out a year later by an en 
banc reversal, and the grounds for reversal were telling. The en banc court 
mumbled some rationalizations about how the “whoever” term in the gratu-
ity statute suggested an individual human being independent of the 
sovereign government, whereas the prosecutor here was the government 
itself. This semantic wriggle dissatisfied even some judges on the pro-
government side of the case; a concurrence asserted that this was sophistry: 
“whoever” really could refer to anyone and even to an intangible entity. The 
honest concurrence explained that the panel had been wrong because, well, 
we have always allowed this particular kind of currency exchange as a nec-
essary tool of law enforcement—and Congress must think it is all right 
because it has never said otherwise. Singleton briefly exposed the commer-
cial side of criminal justice by recognizing that testimony was a form of 
currency in the criminal system. 
In that sense, Singleton was just a step beyond an earlier generation of 
cases, which recognized the role of market-style transactions in criminal 
justice. In Brady v. United States (1970), the Supreme Court brought plea 
bargaining out of the closet and acknowledged the existence of rough-and-
tumble plea dealing, holding that a defendant might rationally waive a trial 
rather than gamble on a very plausible constitutional attack on a death pen-
alty law. In Santobello v. New York (1971), the Court acknowledged that plea 
bargains are subject to mundane state contract law doctrines of breach, re-
pudiation, and rescission.  
Such cases find further confirmation in Judge Easterbrook’s important 
1983 article Criminal Procedure as a Market System, which explains the 
wonderful efficiency of plea bargaining. He explores the following hypotheti-
cal: a factually guilty defendant makes a Fourth Amendment suppression 
motion with a fifty percent chance of success and which, if granted, would 
turn a sure conviction to a sure acquittal. The plea bargaining system enables 
prosecutor and defendant to settle on a deal for half the possible sentence 
(and of course to find a suitable offense somewhere in the penal code that 
would match that sentence). Thus, justice can be “monetized” into an effi-
cient currency. 
Returning to sentencing, pay-to-stay should remind us of the major ear-
lier episode in which the Supreme Court condemned the notion that wealth 
might determine whether, and for how long, someone could be incarcer-
ated—at least where that determination was too transparent. In Bearden v. 
Georgia (1983), a man named Bearden received probation rather than jail on 
the condition that he pay off a fine in installments. Laid off and unable to 
find work, Bearden was sent to jail after all. The Supreme Court viewed this 
incarceration as resulting from unavoidable poverty. The Court noted that it 
had “long been sensitive to the treatment of indigents in our criminal justice 
system,” while adding that it had “also recognized limits on th[is] principle.” 
Drawing on earlier, similar cases such as Williams v. Illinois (1970) and Tate 
v. Short (1971), the Bearden Court held that once the state had initially de-
termined that the fine was appropriate punishment, it could not convert the 
sentence to jail time—at least not where Bearden was demonstrably unable 
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to pay and the state had not even considered reasonable alternatives such as 
an extended installment plan or some sort of work-pay plan.  
Justice White, however, used his concurrence in Bearden to clarify the 
ambivalence—if not hypocrisy—the decision exposed about criminal justice 
in America. He noted that if the trial judge initially had been confident that 
the defendant could not pay the fine, she surely could have constitutionally 
ordered the defendant’s incarceration. In Justice White’s view, the Court had 
been spasmodically anxious and ambivalent about creating the impression 
that wealth classifications cannot influence punishment.  
Indeed, Justice White’s comments remind us that one’s economic condi-
tion is often a major determinant of one’s punishment, including its 
likelihood and the length of any incarceration. Putting aside the meta-
concern that poverty might itself be criminogenic, poverty can sometimes 
deny a defendant the pretrial release that might help to build a defense; it 
can force him to rely on a poorly resourced lawyer; and it might leave him 
without the circle of social resources that would be helpful in winning or 
sustaining release on parole. 
Notably, the Bearden Court waffled between equal protection and due 
process in resolving the case, ultimately relying on the quaintly vague lan-
guage of “fundamental fairness.” This waffling itself reflects an ongoing 
struggle in the Court. When the Court in Douglas v. California (1963) guar-
anteed the right of counsel on first appeal, that decision led some to believe 
that wealth classifications might become unconstitutional in criminal justice 
and elsewhere under Equal Protection. But soon the more general doctrine 
of wealth-based equal protection faded, and the Court worried that other 
doctrines—such as the Gideon Sixth Amendment right—might nevertheless 
impose strict resource-related equity constraints on the states.  
On the question of representation, of course, the Court laid down the 
vague standard of reasonably competent performance, and hence we have 
the occasional eruptions of national embarrassment over absurd fixed-cap 
fees for appointed lawyers or absurdly high caseloads for public defenders 
in major felony cases in many states. By the time the Court decided in Ross 
v. Moffit (1974) that no right of counsel existed after the first appeal, analy-
sis of wealth had shifted mostly from equal protection to due process. Under 
due process, ostensibly rational (if arguably arbitrary) lines could be drawn 
to distinguish when during criminal prosecution the defendant is constitu-
tionally entitled to some resource that might determine the outcome.  
Thus, only some of the inputs into criminal sentences—most obviously 
some minimal representation at trial and first appeal—are subject to a 
wealth-equity test. Others—including representation at later appeals and 
lawyerly and investigative resources beyond a minimum baseline—are not.  
If this is true, then perhaps only some of the outputs of criminal sen-
tences are important enough for such a test. If the poor prisoner is sentenced 
to an otherwise legitimate length of incarceration, and if the “economy 
class” conditions of incarceration do not independently violate the Eighth 
Amendment, then the disparity in the conditions of incarceration is unlikely 
to encounter any constitutional obstacles. 
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II. The Potential Utility of Pay-to-Stay
Putting aside the constitutional questions, consider whether a jurisdic-
tion could choose a wealth-based scheme of incarceration when the 
restraints are budgetary, bureaucratic, or political. Whether pay-to-stay 
proves viable on a larger scale may depend on how its colorful imagery gets 
framed in public discourse. That framing may be done initially by the local 
or state executive branch officials who announce such a scheme, but it will 
still remain subject to considerable reframing by others—including addi-
tional political figures and the press—with a stake in the way we 
incarcerate. 
Under one framing, we should view the costs of necessary punishment 
as part of the harm that a person’s crime has imposed on society, and so, to 
relieve the taxpayers, inmates in general should be forced to pay the costs of 
their incarceration; no further details are relevant. Under another construc-
tion, so long as pay-to-stay only involves misdemeanants, and so long as the 
public notices it mainly in celebrity cases, then it can be tossed off as Hol-
lywood frivolity, not a serious aspect of our jurisprudence. 
But if pay-to-stay is instead framed as a reminder that we have not 
wholly rejected a cash- or commodity-exchange market in criminal justice, 
the outcome might be more productive for our civic discourse. And the spe-
cial features of pay-to-stay may be especially productive on this score. For 
one thing, there is a very non-frivolous, non-symbolic side to pay-to-stay: 
beyond aesthetic and sumptuary perks, pay-to-stay participants can buy im-
munity from exposure to more unsavory inmates. Incarceration, of course, 
does not wholly incapacitate criminals from committing crime; it often just 
redistributes much of it towards fellow inmates, a class that society perhaps 
views as less worthy of protection. Pay-to-stay allows some inmates to pur-
chase protection from this class of crimes. 
Second, if pay-to-stay helps keep jails solvent, it might usefully bring to 
the public consciousness the fact that criminal punishment in the United 
States really is subject to rational cost-benefit analysis. Consider California. 
Great parts of its prison system are now certifiably unconstitutional. Federal 
court orders seeking to address overcrowding require prison officials to weigh 
the costs and benefits of continuing to incarcerate individual prisoners. 
County jails suffer burdens created by the overflow from the overcrowded 
state prisons, so jail administrators constantly make triage decisions about 
who to incarcerate. Confronted with the necessity of housing felons for the 
state, the jailers find themselves often unable to carry out legitimate misde-
meanor sentences.  
Pay-to-stay programs remind us that someone has to pay the bill. Ignor-
ing this reality, politicians tend to declare the punishment of all wrongdoers 
as an irreducible deontological necessity; pay-to-stay reveals the economic 
choices their declarations delegate to sheriffs and jailers.  If media coverage 
of pay-to-stay helps even some of the public to recognize the staggering cost 
of incarceration in California, this public awareness might lead politicians to 
become more willing to treat criminal punishment as a regulatory system 
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worthy of utilitarian assessment rather than treat punishment as a deonto-
logical necessity. The public and politicians might conclude that taxpayers 
are paying too much for some to stay in prison, far more than the prisoners 
themselves could ever pay. They might also start asking whether we are in-
carcerating too many people—or the wrong people. If they do, then that 
type of question should at least become a question discussable without lead-
ing to political suicide for the discussers. 
Conclusion 
As the California legislature dodges the question of what to do about the 
nation’s largest and most dysfunctional jail and prison system, federal 
judges are threatening to expand injunctions in Eighth Amendment lawsuits. 
As noted above, pay-to-stay will not be held to cross constitutional lines—at 
least by itself. But imagine a section 1983 lawsuit about conditions or over-
crowding in regular jails or prisons. And imagine that the state (California 
perhaps?) argues that its obligation to incapacitate criminals in the name of 
public safety is a categorical imperative, such that it is illegitimate for the 
government to engage in cost-benefit analysis when reviewing prison condi-
tions. In such a case, a lawyer representing a plaintiff in a section 1983 
claim might well want to introduce the Santa Ana website in a pleading 
somewhere. This may enable the federal judge to remind the defendants in 
the civil lawsuit that they have already, in some sense, acquiesced in cost-
benefit justice, and that the question has become simply how to work out a 
better business plan. 
